Search results

This paper sets out to discuss white‐collar crime and fraud in China and to draw implications for Western businesses wishing to enter the Chinese market.

The paper provides examples of recent frauds committed in China and also provides a brief review of the literature. It traces the development of China's economy, describing China's modern‐day economy, and also looks at cultural issues and differences between Western and Chinese attitudes.

Western businesses planning to enter the Chinese market need to do their due diligence before committing resources. What works in Western society may not work in another culture, like China's. However, gaining an understanding of the culture and general way of life will go a long way towards laying the groundwork for success.

Additional focus should be placed on examining how cultural differences affect judgments and behaviors.

From a practical standpoint, the paper provides insights into possible areas of disagreement between employees from different cultures that can result from their divergent opinions about individuals' responsibility for fraudulent acts.

One of the key components to fraud prevention is strong internal controls. However, the greatest threat to an organization's information security is the manipulation of employees who are too often the victims of ploys and techniques used by slick con men known as social engineers. The purpose of this paper is to help prevent future incidents by increasing the awareness of social engineering attacks.

A review of the more common social engineering techniques is provided. Emphasis is placed on the fact that it is very easy for someone to become a victim of a social engineer.

While many organizations recognize the importance and value of having strong internal controls, many fail to recognize the dangers associated with social engineering attacks.

Individuals and organizations remain vulnerable to social engineering attacks. The focus on internal controls is simply not enough and is not likely to prevent these attacks. Raising awareness is a good first step to addressing this significant and potentially dangerous problem.

This paper provides a concise summary of the most common social engineering techniques. It provides additional evidence that individuals need to better understand their susceptibility to becoming a victim of a social engineer as victims may expose their organizations to very significant harm.

The focus of this paper is the economic theory of the plans for the European Monetary Union. Part 1 demonstrates that economists, bankers and policy makers know very little about monetary policy. Part 2 explains the errors of the common practice of defining money by its functions. Because any monetary policy must rest on a definition of money it seems reasonable to conclude that a flawed definition might lead to problems with monetary policy. Part 3 applies this insight to the plans for a common currency in Europe. Because of uncertainties about the timing and details of the implementation, some important considerations are necessarily speculative. They are relegated to appendices. Appendix 1 comments on the timing and authorship and responsibility for the official reports with their unspecified authors. Appendix 2 supplies some grounds for doubting the ultimate durability of the European Monetary Union focusing on reasons that are historical, economic and pragmatic. Because the entire movement is driven by politics, not economics, Appendix 3 considers some of the relevant political issues. The conclusions summarize and speculate on possible reasons for successful outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to understand workplace violence risk factors linked to fraud detection and safeguards professionals can implement to reduce such risk.

Sources of information consisted of published news media, scholarly articles, and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that there may be an underestimation by anti‐fraud professionals as to the possibility of a white‐collar criminal resorting to violence to prevent his or her fraud schemes from being detected and disclosed.

The paper represents a useful guide for anti‐fraud professionals to incorporate into their practice by considering workplace risk factors and solutions to mitigate such risks.

This paper serves to educate anti‐fraud professionals to recognize workplace violence risk factors, the behavioral traits of violent white‐collar criminals, and the steps they can take to mitigate such risks.

The purpose of this paper is to expose inefficient regulatory policies and organizational weaknesses at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that have contributed to a series of regulatory oversights that have produced some of the largest fraud schemes perpetrated on investors.

Sources of information consisted of scholarly articles and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that although weaknesses that have been exposed at the SEC may not account for any one securities fraud oversight, cumulatively, the weaknesses create negative synergy that increases the probability that a regulatory oversight will occur.

This paper serves as a useful guide to alert and educate securities regulators and enforcement, regardless of the country they may operate in, to examine their own regulatory policies and organizational structures for weakness that may be similar to the SEC.

The purpose of this paper is to recognize that organized crime and terrorism do not always operate independently from each other but, at times, rely on each other to create synergistic outcomes and use the same tactics and methods to advance their goals such as the use of fraud.

Sources of information consisted of scholarly articles and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that over time the crime‐terror nexus has increased its collaborative nature and terrorists have adopted the use of fraud schemes that were initially believed to be methods used only by organized crime to finance their organizations and goals.

This paper serves as a useful guide to alert and educate anti‐fraud professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of the nexus between organized crime, terrorism and fraud and that fraud should not be viewed as a peripheral issue in the crime‐terror nexus.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a financial fraud practice, known as affinity fraud, relies on building trust with victims based on shared affiliations or characteristics such as age, race, religion, ethnicity or professional designations, for the purpose of exploiting the trust factor for financial advantage.

Sources of information consisted of scholarly articles and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that these fraud offenders rely on a myriad of persuasion techniques to overcome offender skepticism coupled with victims engaging in a psychological concept known as projection bias to evaluate the credibility of these offenders. These factors create a negative synergy that dilutes the perceived need for due diligence normally required prior to engaging in securities transactions. In addition, these offenders display a predatory quality, debunking the myth that fraud offenders exhibit a homogenous crime group behavioral profile.

Social institutions that include both for profit and not for profit should consider evaluating their interactions with those who share similar characteristics and affiliations that attempt to offer goods or services by considering some of the factors contained within this article that may dilute due diligence protocol.

This paper serves to alert and educate anti‐fraud professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of a predatory fraud practice that targets organizations exploiting the inherent trust that these organizations rely upon.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a financial fraud practice, known as affinity fraud, relies on building trust with victims based on shared affiliations or characteristics such as age, race, religion, ethnicity or professional designations, for the purpose of exploiting the trust factor for financial advantage.

Sources of information consisted of scholarly articles and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that these fraud offenders rely on myriad persuasion techniques to overcome offender skepticism coupled with victims engaging in a psychological concept known as projection bias to evaluate the credibility of these offenders. These factors create a negative synergy that dilutes the perceived need for due diligence normally required prior to engaging in securities transactions. In addition, these offenders display a predatory quality. debunking the myth that fraud offenders exhibit a homogenous crime group behavioral profile.

Social institutions that include both for profit and not for profit should consider evaluating their interactions with those who share similar characteristics and affiliations that attempt to offer goods or services by considering some of the factors contained within this paper that may dilute due diligence protocol.

This paper serves to alert and educate anti‐fraud professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of a predatory fraud practice that targets organizations exploiting the inherent trust upon which these organizations rely.

This research provides accounting-ethics authors and administrators with a benchmark for accounting-ethics research. While Bernardi and Bean (2010) considered publications in business-ethics and accounting’s top-40 journals this study considers research in eight accounting-ethics and public-interest journals, as well as, 34 business-ethics journals. We analyzed the contents of our 42 journals for the 25-year period between 1991 through 2015. This research documents the continued growth (Bernardi & Bean, 2007) of accounting-ethics research in both accounting-ethics and business-ethics journals. We provide data on the top-10 ethics authors in each doctoral year group, the top-50 ethics authors over the most recent 10, 20, and 25 years, and a distribution among ethics scholars for these periods. For the 25-year timeframe, our data indicate that only 665 (274) of the 5,125 accounting PhDs/DBAs (13.0% and 5.4% respectively) in Canada and the United States had authored or co-authored one (more than one) ethics article.